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Dave's Federal Case

My problems in the federal courts began in 1988. Two judgments of conviction pursuant to 18 United States Code, Section 844(i) (18 U.S.C. § 844(i)), were eventually entered against me for the arson of a trailered ski-boat and the pipe-bombing of an unoccupied automobile. Those prosecutions were spearheaded by then-Assistant United States Attorney (AUSA), Larry A. Burns, whose conduct throughout, and subsequently in my state case, has been described in many circles as overzealous, fanatical and rabid. Indeed, seventeen years later, Burns' gross malfeasance remains under investigation.

In 2000, the United States Supreme Court decided the case of Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848, 120 S.Ct. 1904, 146 L.Ed.2d 902 (2000); a case "on point" with the facts underlying my alleged offenses. In Jones, the Supreme Court interpreted the terms of § 844(i) -- narrowing the scope of the statute by modifying the elements required for conviction, and holding that § 844(i) did not reach cases such as mine. The Supreme Court expressed that such offenses are, if anything, matters for the consideration of state law enforcement. Thus, I suffer judgments of conviction for acts that do not constitute criminal offenses under United States law. In other words, Burns never had the authority to haul me into court in the first place; the district court had no authority to try, nor jurisdiction over, my charged offenses. Following the Jones ruling -- in cases where a § 844(i) conviction was based upon facts similar to mine -- every federal court outside the Ninth Circuit has vacated the judgment of conviction and freed the falsely imprisoned person. Not so in my cases, because Burns went from AUSA to judge in the very courthouse in which he erroneously prosecuted me. Burns and his brethren are as powerful as they are corrupt.

In every challenge I have brought since the Jones decision invalidated my judgments of conviction I have been denied access to the court. Not once has any judge opined that I do not deserve relief, that the Jones decision does not apply to the facts of my cases, or that my prosecutions, convictions and more than twelve-years in federal prisons were just. Indeed, those judges dare not insult the Supreme Court, so they simply deny me access to the court, thus never addressing the issue on the merits. The judges' standard procedure is to (1) re-characterize my proper filings as something different (e.g., re-characterizing my 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) petitions to motions under 28 U.S.C. § 2255), and (2) then dismissing the § 2255 motion as barred by one procedural rule or another. Not one filing has been left in tact as presented. Not one filing has been addressed on the merits, because to do so would mandate the vacation of my erroneous judgments of conviction -- a result, I have been told, Burns' cohorts will never allow, because that would expose Burns to civil litigation in regards to his gross misconduct in prosecuting me. Burns hides behind the aprons of his fellow judges, while they keep me convicted of offenses that they are painfully aware are unjust. Every one of them has dirty hands, simply caring more for their ill-agenda than they do about their Oaths Of Office to uphold the Constitution and the rights of every person. Below, I list just a few of the egregious acts by Burns and his gang in convicting me for nonexistent offenses and in denying me access to the court since the Jones decision:

  1. Burns secreted to judge Rhoades false tape recordings which he deliberately mismarked to incriminate me in a fabricated murder plot (tapes judge Rhoades either never listened to, or made no effort beyond Burns' word to authenticate the voices). Once the secret tapes were discovered they were proven not to be of me, but two roll-playing government minions;
  2. In other proceedings before judge Rhoades, he once opined that my assertions of a government witness having committed perjury were not of import, because the perjury was corroborated by another government witness -- essentially finding that a lie upon a lie makes a truth;
  3. In a 1993 civil action (Case No. #CV-03-1942-B), where a jail-house snitch turned government agent averred in his own pleadings that he was "at all times a government agent" working for Burns (a fact Burns concealed from the defense and the court), judge Brewster refused to acknowledge the agent's averment and made a finding that there was no evidence that the snitch was a working government agent. We were midway into the case when judge Brewster dismissed it pursuant to the just released Supreme Court decision in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994), which prohibited civil litigation against prosecutors until the underlying conviction is "called into question." Even then, judge Brewster attempted to dismiss the case "with prejudice" so that I would be unable to reactivate the case at such time that I was able to have the conviction "called into question." On appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court Of Appeals (Court Of Appeals) sent the case back to judge Brewster instructing that he issue the dismissal in accordance with the Heck ruling, i.e., "without prejudice.";
  4. Being the tyrant that he is, Burns sought to change the specific terms of my restitution sentence. Judge Rhoades indulged the child. On 21 April, 1995, after years of contentious litigation, judge Rhoades violated well established law in not only altering the unambiguous terms of my restitution sentence, but doing so without me present -- all to no net value except the waste of taxpayers' dollars (a fancy costing taxpayers tens-of-thousands of dollars) and to sate Burns' ego;
  5. When federal and state motions were filed for the return of property, both governments opposed the motions based on arguments that the property might be necessary in any future retrial(s). On 11 October, 1995, judge Rhoades denied my federal motion. The state motion was also denied -- later to be discovered that all the while Burns was covertly, and without court authorization, engaged in destroying property and other evidence crucial to my appeals;
  6. When Burns' perjuries in two personal declarations were exposed, I caused to be filed on 23 February, 1999, my Application To Have The District Court Convene A Grand Jury So That Applicant May Present Evidence Of Perjury By United States Magistrate Larry A. Burns (Case No. #'99-0311-JKS). Eventually, judge James K. Singleton (a federal judge in Alaska, presiding over the case (see, Item #7, below)) squashed Grand Jury review by recasting the perjuries as merely "misinformation", although conceding that Burns had, in fact, provided such "misinformation" in both federal and state prosecutions;
  7. On 26 August, 1999, I moved to recuse all judges and magistrates of the United States District Court for the Southern District of California, at San Diego, due to their gross bias and prejudice against me, and in favor of Burns. That motion was granted on 7 March, 2000, and cases involving myself and Burns sent to judge Singleton, United States District Court Judge for the District of Alaska ( judge Singleton was hand-picked by the Chief Judge of the District Court of San Diego, then approved by rubber-stamp of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.);
  8. A Federal Rules Of Civil Procedure (Fed.R.Civ.P.), Rule 60(b)(6), motion seeking review of Burns' "fraud upon the [federal sentencing] court" was re-characterized by judge Singleton on 5 September, 2000, as a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 and dismissed;
  9. When the government -- confident in her favored position -- filed a critical pleading 42 days late without permission or explanation and later did not oppose my motion, supported by two controlling Supreme Court cases, that their late pleading be stricken from the case, judge Singleton simply ignored my motion and Supreme Court law and allowed the government's late pleading ... just as the government expected;
  10. The heart and soul of Fed.R.Civ.P., Rule 60(b)(4), is to correct null and void convictions, but judge Whelan ignored my filing and repeated requests for a ruling, refusing ever to acknowledge my submission under Rule 60(b)(4);
  11. On 18 July, 2001, I did file into the San Diego District Court my petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). That petition was re-characterized by judge Miller as a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 and dismissed as unauthorized, notwithstanding that within the petition I had reminded all judges of their recused status. Justice be darned, judge Miller ignored that reminder. Judge Miller's "appearance of impropriety" in failing to abide by the recusal Order was presented in a Judicial Complaint to the Court Of Appeals in Case No. #02-89037. The Judicial Council covered their eyes to judge Miller's glaring misconduct.~ */ In an Associated Press article of 16 July, 2002, it was noted that of 766 Judicial Complaints filed in 2001, only one resulted in a penalty. Judges "have an obligation to police themselves, and of course that is the problem," said American University Law Professor, Paul Rice. Furthermore, Rice points out that "[j]udges sit on the boards that review allegations of ethical misconduct and are loath to punish a colleague.";
  12. On 17 January, 2002, I filed a Notice To All Judges And Magistrates Of Their Oath Of Office; Duty To Uphold The Constitution, therein informing every judge and magistrate of their duty to uphold the Constitution and protect the rights of every citizen. Thus, their duty to correct the injustices that are my false convictions. The Notice was served by Certified/Return Receipt mail upon every judge and magistrate in the San Diego District Court. A week later, judge Whelan ruled that the court had no jurisdiction to entertain my Notice of the judges' duty or the issue of my false convictions. Judge Whelan then ordered the Clerk to close the file;
  13. On 19 July, 2002, I filed my Request To Dismiss Indictments, premised on established law that a judgment of conviction rendered by a court lacking jurisdiction over the charged offense is a nullity (judgment for nonexistent offense) and can never become final. Because the judgment can never become final the proceedings remain, by definition, pending, and a defendant may move the court at any time to dismiss the fatally flawed underlying indictment. See, Federal Rules Of Criminal Procedure (Fed.R.Crim.P.), Rule 12(b)(2). Judge Rhoades issued a four sentence denial -- no facts or law cited -- opining simply that I pled guilty, thus am stuck with the convictions (albeit to offenses that do not exist). Contrary to judge Rhoades' opinion, the Constitution and Supreme Court hold that no man can be convicted, by judge, jury or plea of an offense that does not exist. Like judge Miller, judge Rhoades ignored my notice that the prior recusal of all judges in San Diego prohibited him from presiding over the case. Judicial Complaint Case No. #02-50478 was blinked away;
  14. On appeal of judge Rhoades' denial, a three-judge panel of the Court Of Appeals summarily dismissed, opining that the constitutional question of a conviction for a nonexistent offense is so "insubstantial" as not to warrant consideration (Case Nos. #02-50477 and #02-50478);
  15. In late 2001, I transferred from one prison to another. Relocated in a federal district other than that of San Diego, I properly presented another § 2241(c)(3) petition to the district court now having jurisdiction. On 24 September, 2002, that petition was filed in the United States District Court for the Central District of California, at Los Angeles (Case No. #EDCV-02-1030-RT(RC)), and on that same day the assigned magistrate ordered the government to answer in regards to my unconstitutional convictions. Not until 31 March, 2003, did the government file her answer. Then, without prior notice to me of any kind, a judge interjected himself into the case and ordered it transferred to San Diego (court of conviction). The judge ignored the fact that all judges in San Diego are recused, and cannot entertain any filing from me involving Burns. The "fix" was in. My repeated filings, both into the Central District and to San Diego, to be heard concerning the transfer of the case were ignored. Back in San Diego, the petition was given a new Case Number (#03-CV-0795), and sent to judge Singleton, who then re-characterized and dismissed. But judge Singleton went a step further. He ordered the Clerk of the Court to close the file and not to accept any future filings from me;
  16. On 13 May, 2003, the Court Of Appeals erased Case Nos. #02-50477 and #02-50478: "Petitioner's motion for reconsideration en banc ... is denied on behalf of the full court.";
  17. Following the re-characterization and dismissal of Case No. #0795, I did file on 17 June, 2003, my Notice Of Appeal and Application For Certificate Of Appealability (paying the entire filing fee of $105.00, which the court greedily swallowed). But judge Singleton had more dirty tricks up his sleeve. He deliberately misconstrued the Application For Certificate Of Appealability as a request for authorization to file a second or success motion under § 2255 (a filing that does not go to the district court, and does not require any filing fee). Judge Singleton then ignored my every request that he rule specifically on the Certificate Of Appealability;
  18. Not to be discouraged by the en banc denial, I marched on to the Supreme Court, filing on 15 July, 2003, my Petition For Writ Of Certiorari raising before the High Court three questions as to the constitutionality of the lower courts' actions in matters of my Request To Dismiss Indictments;
  19. On 6 October, 2003, the Supreme Court denied my Petition For Writ Of Certiorari (Case No. #03-5892). The constitutional questions presented would not, this time, become one of the favored 1% of cases accepted for full briefing, argument and decision. Maybe next time. And there will be a next time. The denial effectively terminated my efforts to have the indictments dismissed;
    The Jones ruling came down in 2000. Since that time I have been unrelenting in efforts to have my false convictions vacated. As the above chronology shows, I have attempted every proper and legal means to gain access into the district court. The corrupt judges of the San Diego District Court, with the unwavering complicity of judge Singleton, have improperly and illegally kept the courthouse doors closed, bolted and barricaded. Those judges have ignored motions, re-characterized filings and then dismissed them, misconstrued applications, and have ordered cases closed and instructed the Clerks not to accept any further filing from me. Indeed, those judges have unanimously held that I could never access the court by way of any § 2241 petition. They were all wrong. Because only the guilty go quietly to the gallows, I never let their foolish Orders and gross malfeasance deter me from my quest. Also, I believed in my understanding of the law, and was convinced that § 2241 was the proper and legal means to access the court, and to challenge my null and void judgments of conviction. As you will now see, I was right.
  20. On 23 December, 2004, I filed into the Court Of Appeals my Application For Leave To File Second Or Successive Petition Or Motion Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 Or § 2255 (Case No. #04-76726). Obtaining authorization to file a second/successive § 2255 motion is, however, a near impossibility. But, that was not my goal. In fact, the Application was merely the means to an end, a way to get into the Court Of Appeals. Without going into a very lengthy discussion as to (1) the retroactive nature of the Jones ruling, and (2) whether it is a new rule of constitutional law, suffice to say the issues were arguable and sufficient for my purposes. Most importantly, in the Application I argued the constitutional concerns that would arise if the Court Of Appeals did not grant authorization to file a second/successive § 2255 motion. The issue, therefore, was problematic for the Court Of Appeals; here was a person convicted for nonexistent offenses raising the very real issue of denial of access to the court. My strategy was to give the Court Of Appeals a way out by offering that it could deny § 2255 authorization by granting permission to bring my challenge by way of a § 2241 petition. The Court Of Appeals did what I have never before seen them do -- they issued an Order to the government to reply ("The application for authorization to file a second or successive 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion in the district court raises issues that warrant a response."). The government eventually responded (although there was some chicanery in failing to mail me their response, thus attempting to cause me to miss the filing deadline to reply). The government fell into the trap by arguing narrowly that the Jones ruling did not warrant § 2255 authorization. The Court Of Appeals was then presented with my reply, citing controlling law, that the Court Of Appeals must, if not authorizing § 2255 access, provide access by way of § 2241. To deny both would raise an issue of constitutional concern;
  21. On 30 March, 2005, the Court Of Appeals returned my $105.00 filing fee from Case No. #0795. Although the fee was returned, and despite my best efforts, the issues were never addressed, having been lost in the confusion generated by judge Singleton's deliberate misconstruing of the Certificate Of Appealability;
  22. On 21 June, 2005, the Court Of Appeals issued her Order in Case No. #76726 (§ 2255 authorization is denied without prejudice to the filing of the issues into the district court under § 2241);
  23. On 21 July, 2005, I did file into the District Court my Petition Pursuant To Article I, Section 9, Clause 2, Of The United States Constitution (The Great Writ Of Habeas Corpus; 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3)). While it would appear incredible to someone unaware of the corruption in the San Diego District Court, it came as no surprise to me that the case was assigned to my ex-prosecutor, now-judge, Larry A. Burns! In a rare glimmer of ethical conduct, Burns removed himself from the case. Reverting to form, however, he turned the case over to a fellow judge in that same courthouse where, as he is well aware, all judges have been recused from cases involving him and I;
  24. On 5 August, 2005, United States District Court Judge, Dana M. Sabraw, issued an Order Requiring Response From Government. Sabraw ordered the United States Attorney to file and serve a response to the petition no later than September 30, 2005;
  25. On 9 August, 2005, I did file my Motion Reminding Judges Of Recusal Order (all judges of that courthouse having been recused in 2000 by order of the Chief Judge) seeking the immediate disqualification of all judges of the San Diego District Court from the instant § 2241 petition involving my fraudulent prosecution by Burns and resulting erroneous convictions;
  26. Having received no response from the government, I did file on 5 October, 2005, my Ex Parte Notice Of Intent To File Reply; filed with heightened caution in case the government had timely filed a response but had failed to serve me (this happens with some regularity). I did properly serve a copy of my Notice on the government;
  27. Still having received nothing from the government, I did file, and serve upon the government on 30 October, 2005, my Motion That Court Grant In Total Unopposed Petition Pursuant To Article I, Section 9, Clause 2, Of The United States Constitution (The Great Writ Of Habeas Corpus; 28 U.S.C. 2241(c)(3)). My Motion noticed the Court of the controlling Supreme Court law holding that one day late is fatal in matters of missed filing deadlines. In this case the government was a full 30 days late;
  28. On 3 November, 2005, the government applied to Sabraw . to allow them until 28 November, 2005, in which to file a reply to my Petition;
  29. On 3 November, 2005, without allowing any opposition, and ignoring the controlling Supreme Court law on the matter, Sabraw granted the government until 28 November, 2005, in which to respond to my Petition; another of the many examples through the years of those judges refusing to follow the law in matters involving myself and Burns, always to the benefit of the government (to the protection of Burns), and always to my detriment;
  30. The Government's Response And Opposition To Petitioner's Petition For Writ Of Habeas Corpus Pursuant To 28 U.S.C. 2241 was filed on 28 November, 2005. The Response did not argue against relief, but sought the dismissal of the Petition for its refiling in the District Court in the district of my incarceration: "The Government respectfully requests that this Court deny habeas relief, without prejudice, so that Harrison may file this 5 2241 claim before the proper court: the district court for Central District of California.";
  31. In a supplemental reply, filed 23 January, 2006, I argued that denial of the Petition would be contrary to established law. In fact, the very case cited by the government required that Sabraw's only act could be to transfer the case to the District Court for the Central District;
  32. Sabraw, who was handed my Petition by Burns, was not about to let down her brethren. On 27 February, 2006, Sabraw ignored the government, the Ninth Circuit Court Of Appeals, and the law, and dismissed the Petition on the grounds that I was barred from bringing the § 2241 petition at all! Sabraw "conclude[d]" that the Ninth Circuit Order granting me the presentation of my issues by way of 5 2241 jurisdiction didn't mean that at all. Sabraw opined that what the Ninth Circuit meant was that I could file the Petition, but not necessarily proceed with it. If it weren't such a blatant act contrary to law it would almost be comical. No doubt Burns bought Sabraw champagne and chocolates for her favor. Even more despicable was the , reasoning underlying Sabraw's dismissal of the Petition; opining that since I did not challenge the issues in 1989 (at the time of my direct appeal) or 1992 (at the time of my first and only motion under 5 2255) -- ELEVEN YEARS AND EIGHT YEARS, RESPECTIVELY, BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT CHANGED THE LAW THAT DECRIMINALIZED MY ALLEGED CONDUCT -- I was barred in raising the issues now. Sabraw ignored the fact that the Ninth Circuit had already addressed this precise issue in granting me 5 2241 jurisdiction to present the issues, and ignoring well established case law throughout the country that a convicted person be provided an unobstructed opportunity to raise an issue once the Supreme Court changes the law. Sabraw could not cite a single case to support her ruling (two wholly inapplicable cases were offered); a ruling issued to hinder my federal convictions being overturned, and to protect Burns from his exposure to civil litigation for the 12+ years I was falsely convicted and imprisoned. In a footnote, and baldly turning a blind eye to the Chief Judge's order recusing all judges of that courthouse, Sabraw refused to disqualify herself from the case, suggesting, without more, that she had no conflict;
  33. On 24 March, 2006, I filed my timely Notice Of Appeal. Along with the NOA I filed my certified papers to waive the filing fee. Although the NOA was properly filed, Sabraw deliberately ignored the waiver of fee request. The Court Of Appeals then warned, naturally, that the appeal was subject to dismissal since the filing fee had not been paid. I diligently refiled paperwork directly with the Court Of Appeals asking that the filing fees be waived, hopefully averting Sabraw's end-game to abort my efforts to appeal her malfeasance in dismissing the § 2241 petition;
  34. On 8 May, 2006, Appeals Commissioner, Peter L. Shaw, issued an Order instructing the District Court to either issue, or decline to issue, a Certificate Of Appealability, which is required in certain types of cases before an appeal may be taken. A COA is in effect permission from the District Court to appeal. COAs are one of the poisons of the Antiterrorism And Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, and ask the same judge who denied the petition to grant the petitioner the right to appeal. Essentially, the judge has to tell the Court Of Appeals that their ruling may have been wrong. As you can imagine, that rarely happens. In my case, Sabraw wasn't about to confess that her grossly illegal ruling was wrong. Sabraw kept to her ruling, telling the Court Of Appeals that she declined to issue any COA because no court could disagree with her finding that I was barred from bringing the petition that, in her twisted wisdom, should have been brought 11 and 8 years BEFORE the Supreme Court changed the law. Sabraw did not cite a single pertinent case to support her position declining to issue the COA.
  35. On 26 May, 2006, I filed papers challenging Shaw's Order requiring a Certificate of Appealability ("COA"), arguing that a COA is not required in the nature of appeal before the Court Of Appeals;
  36. Having not heard from the Court Of Appeals, I did file my Motion For Certificate Of Appealability on 14 June, 2006. Statute provides that once the District Court declines to issue the COA, a petitioner may seek issuance of the COA from the Court Of Appeals (and, if need be, from the Supreme Court in the event the Court Of Appeals declines to issue a COA);
  37. On 19 July, 2006, the Court Of Appeals found that no decision in the Ninth Circuit had ever decided the issue I had challenged, whether a COA was required in the nature of appeal now before the Court Of Appeals. The Court Of Appeals ordered that counsel be appointed to represent me, and counsel and the government would file briefs specifically addressing the issue being challenged;
  38. Following briefing, oral arguments were held on 27 September, 2007;
  39. On 20 March, 2008, a three-judge panel of the Court Of Appeals issued an incredible ruling throwing out the appeal of my 1988 federal convictions. The panel opined that federal statutes do not allow me to appeal my convictions despite the, United States Supreme Court's ruling in 2000 (a ruling occurring more than a decade after my convictions) holding that my alleged conduct does not fall within the reach of federal law enforcement authorities. In other words, the panel decided that despite my convictions for conduct that is not criminal under federal law (convictions for nonexistent crimes) I am foreclosed any judicial remedy to challenge the erroneous convictions. As you are aware from this chronology, see, #22, above, a prior three-judge panel held just the opposite, holding that I am entitled to challenge the convictions in light of the Supreme Court's ruling. The latter panel effectively overturned the former panel's holding. Yet, statutes and well-established law hold that the holdings of a prior panel control and may not be overturned except by the entire Ninth Circuit Court sitting en banc or by the Supreme Court. No subsequent three-judge panel can overturn a prior panel's holding. But they did it in this case! As was recently stated in one of the many legal newsletters I receive: "Success in the Ninth Circuit continues to depend not on the law, not even on Ninth Circuit law, but solely on the luck of the draw."; Oddly enough, after throwing my case out, the rogue panel went on to hold that henceforth, as a matter of Ninth Circuit law, a COA is not required in the nature of appeal I had presented to them;
  40. My requests for rehearing by the rogue panel or by the en banc Court were denied, so I am now headed to the Supreme Court (petition for writ of certiorari ("cert.")) with the constitutional question: How does a person, convicted for crimes that do not exist, gain access to the court to challenge such convictions? The chances of the Supreme Court accepting my cert. for briefing and consideration are about .8%. Still, better than the lottery. But don't fret, even if the Supreme Court does not accept my cert., other possibilities exist. We are far from done;
  41. On 6 October, 2008, the Supreme Court denied the cert. petition.
  42. On 21 November, 2008, I filed into the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals my Motion Pursuant To The All writs Act (Coram Nobis And/Or Audita Querela); The Ends Of Justice. That unique and seldom used motion was filed under the Case Number of the three judge panel that in 2005 ruled in my favor, ordering the district court to hear my appeal of the federal convictions (see, #22, above). Strangely, the Clerk of the Court stamped the motion "RECEIVED," but has never stamped the motion as filed.
  43. On 23 March, 2009, I sent a letter to the Clerk asking why the motion has not been filed. To date, 23 April, 2009, the Clerk has not responded.
  44. In time, the Court Of Appeals instructed that the coram nobis may in the first instance be filed in the District Court.
  45. On 12 August, 2009, my Motion Pursuant To The All Writs Act (Coram Nobis And/or Audita Querela); The Ends Of Justice was filed in the District Court (Case No. '09-CV-1792-DMS(AJB)).
  46. On 9 September, 2009, District Court Judge, Dana M. Sabraw, issued her "Order: (1) Granting Application To Proceed In Forma Pauperis, and (2) Dismissing Case Without Prejudice. What that means is (1) I was allowed to proceed without prepayment of filing fees, and (2) the case was dismissed.

    You may recall, Sabraw is an abettor of my ex-prosecutor, Larry A. Burns, and has repeatedly dismissed cases of mine despite the merits of the cases and instruction of the Ninth Circuit Court Of Appeals that my cases be heard. This time, again, Sabraw did not recuse from the case, despite my reminder that all judges had previously been recused, and timely and proper filing seeking to recuse all judges this go-around. In blatant defiance of well-established law of the United States Supreme Court, and statues, Sabraw did not even address the recusal request, ignoring it completely.

    To achieve her desired dismissal, Sabraw re-characterized the coram nobis filing as a motion under either 28 U.S.C. 2254 or 2255; Sabraw's Order is disjointed and convoluted. But that is not surprising, being that my filing was explicitly presented as a motion under 28 U.S.C. 1651 -- the All Writs Act, which encompasses coram nobis. Sabraw deliberately ignored the statutory jurisdiction (28 U.S.C. 1651) given and usurped jurisdiction (28 U.S.C. 2254/2255) that suited her ill-agenda of dismissing the case. Her actions are, in the words of the United States Supreme Court, "treason to the constitution."

  47. On 25 September, 2009, I did file into the District Court my Notice Of Appeal, seeking to appeal the dismissal. Sabraw will next deny me the ability to appeal by denying me a Certificate Of Appealability ("COA"). I know her game, and will then go to the Court of Appeals for the COA.
  48. On 1 October, 2009, I did send to the District Court, for filing, my Motion: Certificate Of Appealability Not Required, noticing the District Court that pursuant to Ninth Circuit law no COA is required of my coram nobis filing. Sabraw will ignore the law, and simply opine that the filing is not a coram nobis, but either a motion under 2254 or 2255, thus a COA is required. As mentioned, I'll argue it to the Court Of Appeals.

To Be Continued ..

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